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Abstract 
Basic Emotions Theory (BET) is the most popular and deeply rooted psychological 
theory of both emotion and the facial behavior held to express it. We review its Western 
foundations and the key developments in its evolution, focusing on its parsing of facial 
expressions into two kinds: biological, categorical, iconic, universal “facial expressions 
of emotion,” versus modified, culturally diverse versions of those iconic expressions 
due to intermediation by learned “display rules.” We suggest that this dichotomy and its 
many corollaries are oversimplified, and that many of BET’s recent modifications are 
inconsistent in ways that may render it impossible to test and immune to falsification. In 
contrast, we suggest that the behavioral ecology view of facial displays, as an externalist 
and functionalist approach, resolves the quandaries and contradictions embedded in 
BET’s precepts and extensions.  
 
Keywords: facial expressions, basic emotions theory, behavioral ecology, history of 
emotions, display rules  
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Inside-Out: From Basic Emotions Theory to the Behavioral Ecology View 
  
All scientific theories are approximations. Within the sociology of science, it is 
prosaic to note that their value is not only to guide hypothesis-testing in research but to 
inspire research in the first place. Basic Emotions Theory (BET) as a scientific 
enterprise is now nearly 60 years old (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1969b; Izard, 1971; 
Tomkins, 1962, 1963). BET and its various formulations brought the study of human 
facial behavior from back burner to front page (Ekman, 1972, 1980, 1993; Ekman & 
Cordaro, 2011) (Figure 1). It led many psychologists into contact with the Darwinism of 
the day, and with longstanding questions about biology-culture interaction. Its 
unabashed promotion of emotion concepts was counterpoint to Psychology’s dalliances 
with a “mindless” Behaviorism and the brewing, desiccated “Cognitive Revolution.” 
Likewise, BET supporters made their findings accessible to larger audiences and 
bridged the gap between basic and applied sciences. BET became canonical, and its 
“ground truths” provided solid foundations for researchers interested, directly or 
indirectly, in investigations of emotions and facial expressions.1  
_____________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
_____________________________________________ 
BET started with a bang, and it easily rode the Zeitgeist. Illustrated studies of 
people’s faces in exotic locales in the late 1960s captured public attention and real-
world applications of BET started to emerge. Pronouncements that certain facial 
expressions were produced and understood identically by everyone, everywhere, 
suggested that military efforts to improve interrogation and detection of deception 
would be globally applicable (Ekman, 1985; cf. U.S. Government Accountability 
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Office, 2013, 2018; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2011).  
Although BET certainly catalyzed research, modifications and concessions 
mandated by new evidence, as well as findings of incomplete reportage, now leave the 
different mutations of BET in need of repair (Buck, 1984; Ekman, 1997, 2017; Izard, 
2011; Keltner & Ekman, 2000; Keltner, Tracy, Sauter, Cordaro, & McNeil, 2016; 
Levenson, 2011; Matsumoto, Keltner, Shiota, O’Sullivan, & Frank, 2008; Sauter, 2017; 
Scarantino, 2017; Tracy, 2014).  
Numerous critiques of BET have appeared since its inception, and these have 
focused mostly on the validity of “basic emotions,” or the weight of evidence bearing 
on some of its related claims (Aviezer, Trope, & Todorov, 2012; Durán, Reisenzein, & 
Fernández-Dols, 2017; Fridlund, 1994; Gendron, Crivelli, & Barrett, 2018; Jack, 
Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Leys, 2017; Ortony & Turner, 1990; Russell, 
1994). This paper is different. It centers on the internal inconsistencies within BET that 
have resulted in logical incoherence and vitiated its core assumptions. Some of these 
problems led one of us (Fridlund) to break off from BET more than 25 years ago and 
propose a more workable view, the Behavioral Ecology View of facial displays (BECV; 
Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018; Fridlund, 1991a, 1992a, 1994, 2017a).  
In the early 1990s, BECV began to offer a functional and externalist perspective 
based on modern theories of animal communication and biological and cultural 
evolution. Almost 30 years after BECV emerged as a robust alternative theory for 
describing and explaining human facial behavior, we believe it is appropriate to provide 
an account of what drove BET’s ascent, along with the internal contradictions it 
accumulated along the way. We hope to convince the reader that BET, although it once 
catalyzed facial-behavior research, now constrains it, in ways that both adherents and 
novitiates have not appreciated. We suggest that BECV’s more open framework 
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circumvents many of the difficulties inherent in BET, and offers the promise of new 
discoveries outside the strictures imposed by BET’s presuppositions. 
BET as an Essentialist View of Emotions and Facial Displays  
We are obliged once more to begin with William James’s subversive (1884) 
query, “What is an emotion?” To any empiricist, the quote is now an embarrassing jab. 
Well over a century later, there remains no scientific consensus about how “emotion” 
should be defined or measured, which makes debates as to how it should be categorized, 
or whether it can be, especially tendentious (Kagan, 2007; Solomon, 2003). One 
research team tabulated 92 separate definitions of “emotion,” even when the search was 
restricted just to English-language experimental psychology papers between 1872 and 
1980 (Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981). Those 92 emotion definitions, however, barely 
cover how the term has been used historically or is now bandied about in philosophy, 
theology, and by non-Western thinkers (Plamper, 2015).  
Even given that the term “emotion” lacks consensual meaning (Kagan, 2007; 
Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981), BET supporters are not alone in believing that their 
own varied definitions are uniquely correct. Because the term is used and distended in 
so many different ways, both in and out of BET theorizing, arguments about whether or 
how emotion causes or relates to facial expressions are just shadow-boxing (Fridlund, 
1994).2 
Philosophical Origins of Separable, Numerable Emotions 
Notwithstanding pre-emptive objections that vex any theory of “emotion,” BET 
stipulates the existence of numerable, separable emotions. The beginnings of this claim 
lie in Western preconceptions about emotions and the nature of the Self, which can be 
traced at least to the Golden Age of Greece. Plato dealt with the “passions,” and he cast 
them as forces competing with Reason (i.e., in his celebrated metaphor from Phaedrus, 
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a Charioteer, the Intellect, steered his two horses, the righteous and the impetuous 
Passions). It was Aristotle, though, who listed categorical passions of “anger, pity, fear, 
and all similar emotions and their contraries” as among the pathé that caused “men to 
change their opinion in regard to their judgments” (Konstan, 2006).  
Descartes continued the Hellenic, and especially Platonic, notion of Emotion as 
set against Reason (Sihvola & Engberg-Pedersen, 1998). Descartes’ (1649/2015) Les 
passions de l’âme (“passions of the soul”) elaborated upon Aristotle’s system and listed 
six primary “passions”—wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy, and sadness. These passions 
approximate contemporary notions of “emotions.” For the dualist Descartes, the 
passions were perturbations in the “animal spirits” that animated the corporeal body. 
The passions could become sufficiently intense to traverse the metaphysical pineal 
divide, sabotaging the rationality of the incorporeal Soul and fomenting incivility in the 
material world (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018).  
Artistic Proclamations about Separable, Numerable Expressions 
The Cartesian system concerned internal turbulence but not facial expression. 
Indeed, pre-Cartesian thought focused on facial physiognomy and character 
assignations, and paid scant notice to facial movements (Fridlund, 1994). The passions 
were tied systematically to the face by Descartes’s French contemporary, artist Charles 
LeBrun. 
LeBrun was court painter to Louis XIV, and he came to dictate nearly all artistic 
mores throughout 17th century France and beyond (Browne, 1985). In a celebrated 
lecture to the Académie Royale de Peinture et de Sculpture in 1668, LeBrun prescribed 
the anatomically correct and appropriately nuanced facial configuration for each 
Cartesian passion. He depicted these using schematic heads with overlaid grids as well 
as finished paintings (Hogg, 2014; Ross, 1984).  
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These artistic prescriptions regarding emotions and facial expressions soon 
became conventional wisdom.3 They were integral to the 19th century Zeitgeist via both 
the biological and medical sciences, and the teleological proclamations of Natural 
Theology (Montagu, 1994). One proponent of Natural Theology was the 19th century 
English painter, physician, and anatomist Charles Bell, known best for the type of 
unilateral facial paralysis that bears his name. In his Essays on the Anatomy of 
Expression in Painting (1806), Bell claimed that humans possessed “a peculiar set of 
muscles to which no other office can be assigned than to serve for expression” (p. 121), 
and these were proof that “the design of man’s being was, that he might praise and 
honor his maker” (p. 105).  
Facial Expressions as Vestiges: Darwin’s Reflexology 
Originally, BET called upon the work of Charles Darwin, whose The Expression 
of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872/1965) was a meandering though brilliantly 
observant overflow of notes originally intended for The Descent of Man (1871; see 
Browne, 1985). Darwin (1872/1965) set out an expression reflexology whereby most of 
our facial expressions were vestiges of behaviors that were ancestrally “once 
serviceable.” These behaviors were not Cartesian passions, but movements associated 
with numerous “states of mind” (e.g., horror, determination, devotion, modesty, hunger, 
meditation) that were sometimes vestigial themselves. 
In Darwin’s system, if you offend me, I might sneer at you because my ancestor 
would have kill-bitten at your neck. My sneer is a degenerated habit passed down via 
Lamarckian inheritance, as is the “state of mind” that provoked it; both are weakened 
forms of the originals.4 Others might find a sneer informative, but that is not what that 
sneer is for. Indeed, for Darwin, that sneer was not “for” anything. This non-
adaptationist account of expressions was forced on Darwin, who based his main defense 
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of natural selection writ large not on adaptation—this would have also supported Bell’s 
advocacy of Divine Creation—but on evidence of useless structures and behaviors that 
could only indicate descent with modification (Burkhardt, 1985). Indeed, Darwin 
confided to Alfred Russel Wallace that, in Expression, this tactic was precisely to 
disarm Charles Bell and his version of Natural Theology: “I want, anyhow, to upset Sir 
C. Bell’s view … that certain muscles have been given to man solely that he may reveal 
to other men his feelings” (Fridlund, 1992b, 1994). 
Socialization and Variation: Allport’s Developmental Modification of Darwin’s 
Reflexology  
Social psychologist Floyd Allport (1924) accepted the Darwinian reflexology 
but added an ontogenetic superstructure. Allport proposed that our facial behavior 
constituted a “language of the face” wherein “in their various combinations and degrees 
the manifest expressions run well into the hundreds.” These expressions belonged in six 
categories that only partially overlapped the Cartesian six: pain-grief, surprise-fear, 
anger, disgust, pleasure, and “various attitudes” of neutral hedonic tone. Using 
anatomical drawings and engravings from several contemporary painters and 
photographers, Allport tabulated the exact facial movements that represented each 
group.  
Allport did not consider the Darwinian expressive habits to be linked innately to 
our adult emotional and mental states. This was a frank break with Darwin’s vestigial 
reflexology. For Allport, the expressions predate their connections to any hedonics; 
those connections were acquired via early social conditioning. That conditioning, in 
turn, was due to our expressive habits’ producing reactions in others which resulted in 
reciprocal counteractions. This meant that our expressions would automatically become 
socially functional during development. Our facial response repertoires enlarged and 
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differentiated with along with the process of analogizing, as formulated in prior mimesis 
theories (e.g., Piderit, 1867; Wundt, 1897). For instance, I may be made nauseous by 
foul tastes and odors to start. Then, by “unconscious metaphor,” I learn to become 
“disgusted” by redolent ideas or actions, and these associations may become part of a 
culture’s aesthetic sensibilities.  
Although many researchers in Allport’s time granted that some facial behavior 
was probably universal (e.g., startle to noise, wincing to pain), Allport (1924) stressed 
just how much the meanings of our facial expressions depend upon the context in which 
they are issued: 
When we come upon an individual or a group of people expressing some 
strong emotion, we immediately attempt to find out what has happened. 
This knowledge at once gives significance to the otherwise chaotic mass 
of facial expressions. (p. 226) 
Whereas this insight received support in studies by Landis (1924) and others, 
BET assumed nonetheless that the iconic “facial expressions of emotion” were 
automatic, suppressed only with great difficulty, and had meanings that were invariant 
and minimally context-dependent (Calder & Young, 2005; Ekman, Friesen, Ellsworth, 
1972; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1987). BET’s claim became the new regnant view until the 
late 1990s, when the earlier findings of context-dependency in affective attributions to 
facial displays were reconfirmed in multiple studies (Barrett, Mesquita, & Gendron, 
2011; Carroll & Russell, 1996; Fernández-Dols & Carroll, 1997; Hassin, Aviezer, & 
Bentin, 2013). 
Tomkins’s Primary Affects 
BET’s formulation of categorical, universal emotions and matching expressions 
of them was cemented in the writings of Silvan Tomkins (Tomkins, 1962, 1963, 1991, 
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1992). Leys (2017) has detailed the development of Tomkins’s theory, beginning in the 
1950s. Tomkins laid out his sprawling view in four long volumes spanning 30 years, in 
what probably amounts to the last of the grand, personal, oracular theories of 
personality. 
Tomkins inveighed against the prevailing Freudian drive theory, which was 
object-oriented (the drives were about things) and “intentional” (in a philosophical 
sense; i.e., they were goal-oriented). He aimed to supplant the Freudian approach by 
appropriating parts of the new field of cybernetics, a set of approaches toward self-
regulating systems which goes back to antiquity but gained its footing in WWII research 
by Norbert Weiner, Alan Turing, John von Neumann, and others (Leys, 2017). 
Cybernetics contained the concepts of negative feedback and semi-autonomous 
servomechanisms, both of which facilitated wartime technical developments such as 
game theory and inertial guidance. 
Tomkins’s personal revelation was envisioning a set of “primary affects” which 
acted like self-contained automata, independent of cognition, inherently objectless, and 
“non-intentional.” As such, these affects “happened to us” rather than being within our 
agency or instrumentality. Consequently, the “primary affects” Tomkins presented were 
not only primary among the affects, they had primacy over the drives and were co-equal 
and concurrent with cognition (e.g., our affects might be triggered and we might or 
might not know why). This elevation of affect—which co-opted the same cybernetic 
model that was au courant in cognition—allowed Tomkins to strike an ancillary blow 
against the prevailing behaviorism that had captured Psychology and had devalued or 
disqualified mentation as a proper subject of study (Leys, 2017).  
Despite his cybernetic turn, Tomkins endorsed Darwin’s account of universal 
expressive habits, and re-discovered “faradic” (electrical) stimulation studies conducted 
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by the 19th century French physician G. B. A. Duchenne, best known for inventing the 
biopsy and discovering a type of muscular dystrophy. Duchenne’s mechanistic creation 
of simulated expressions led Tomkins to a similar view of everyday ones. Tomkins 
postulated pre-wired “triggers” for each of his affects, and the affect automata, in turn 
produced distinguishable and universally recognizable facial configurations. 
What were Tomkins’s primary affects and how did he derive them? Like those 
of Descartes, Lebrun, and Allport before him, Tomkins’s were pronouncements born of 
personal observation, especially of his young child. For Tomkins, there were eight at 
first: interest, surprise, joy, anger, fear, distress, disgust, and shame. He later added 
dissmell, or contempt (Leys, 2017).  
BET Goes Mainstream and Toward Predictability 
Fitting Passions to Expressions 
The Cartesian categories did not map neatly onto Aristotle’s pathé, nor did 
Allport’s map neatly onto either. Tomkins, like his predecessors, added emotions purely 
by intuition.5 Thus, on the “passions” side there was little consensus regarding how 
many emotions there were to be expressed. Unsurprisingly, Descartes gave no formal 
thought to whether the “passions” would be expressed universally because his concern 
was how those corporeal, material passions affected the immortal and immaterial Soul. 
LeBrun took it for granted that the expressions he painted and prescribed reflected 
common humanity. Allport’s theory was the exception. It granted socialization such 
sway that strong links between emotion and expression could not be assumed. 
Darwin’s writings suggested a “common humanity” to our expressive behavior 
but tied it to a litany of “states of mind” rather than a constrained set of “passions.” 
Tomkins’s theory appears to be the first systematic scheme that stipulated both a 
delimited set of emotions and a matching set of characteristic, universally produced and 
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understood expressions. 
Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory: Defining Extremes and Claiming the Middle 
Tomkins’s conception that facial expressions were “released” by pre-wired 
triggers was strikingly similar to the views of ethologists Niko Tinbergen (1953) and 
Konrad Lorenz (1970) from the 1940s and 50s. They regarded animals as rather hapless 
creatures governed by tripwire Fixed Action Patterns, and these stereotyped behavioral 
patterns were triggered by “releasing stimuli” that engaged Innate Releasing 
Mechanisms. Likewise, Tomkins’s primary affects were entirely internal and evoked by 
external triggers, their evocation was eruptive, and they had no inherent object or action 
plan (again, Tomkins’s affects did not imply “intentionality”; Leys, 2017).  
This mid-20th century ethology—via Tomkins’s writings—was concretized in 
Paul Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory (Ekman, 1972, 1980, 1982). Ekman’s approach to 
facial displays and emotions remains overwhelmingly the most influential and best-
developed form of BET (and for the remainder of this paper, “BET” when unqualified 
will refer to Ekman’s Neurocultural model).6 
Prior to the 1970s the field of emotions and facial expressions was largely the 
domain of a small group of social-anthropological researchers, who viewed expressions 
as culturally situated and idiomatic like language. In his late 1960s and early 1970s 
writings, Ekman inveighed against these “relativists” (at times, “cultural relativists”), 
who “[hold] that all facial expressions are culture-specific” (Ekman, 1972, p. 240). He 
singled out anthropologist Ray Birdwhistell as someone who “cannot admit the 
possibility of universals in facial expressions and maintain his central claim that facial 
and body behavior is a language…” (Ekman, 1972, p. 209).  
This characterization was inaccurate, as the issue was never about admitting 
possibilities but about which ones to emphasize. Birdwhistell (1970), like his mentors 
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and colleagues Gregory Bateson, Margaret Mead, and Erving Goffman, focused on the 
microsociology of social interaction, and he pioneered the detailed study of filmed 
social behavior in normal and clinical settings, at home and abroad. Birdwhistell was 
impressed by the cultural variation in expressions, gestures, and customs in the 
everyday interactions he filmed. Ekman wanted to claim universality in facial 
expressions, and mainly used still photos isolated from any wider context. Compared to 
the conventional anthropological approach, Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory, albeit with 
all its presuppositions and stipulations, suggested a way to study facial behavior that 
lent itself far better to deductive hypothesis-testing and standard laboratory methods.  
The stark portrayal of the “relativists” extended to the Neurocultural Theory’s 
treatment of Darwin, who—despite his ample discussion of cultural variation in 
Expression—was rhetorically counterpoised by Ekman as a strong universalist. This 
portrayal underplayed Darwin’s highlighting of the paralinguistic use of the face and his 
belief that variations among facial expressions might be as informative about culture as 
linguistic variations. As linguist Halszka Bąk (2016) put it, “Darwin’s ideas appear to 
have more in common with those [of] Edward Sapir than those of later reductionist 
theorists of emotion who claim for themselves Darwin’s intellectual legacy ... (Ekman, 
1998).” (p. 29). 
In the Neurocultural Theory, there were originally six iconic expressions, each 
produced by a “basic emotion,” with the expressions selected somewhat arbitrarily from 
Tomkins’s nine (Colombetti, 2014). There were categorical expressions for happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, surprise, and disgust (at times, disgust-contempt; e.g., Ekman, 
Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969). Determining which emotions were basic appeared simple, 
if circular. The occurrence of a unique, pan-culturally recognized “facial expression of 
emotion” by definition verified that the emitter was experiencing that emotion (Ekman, 
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1980). Conversely, the emotions were considered “primary” (basic) if and only if they 
had such expressions associated with them (Ekman, 1972, 1982). In this way, the “facial 
expression of emotions” became a royal road by which otherwise unobservable, 
subpersonal basic emotions were “read out” and “communicated.”  
 Having situated Darwin on one side with the relativists on the other, the 
Neurocultural Theory positioned itself as ecumenical. For Ekman and his colleagues, 
however, their studies and reinterpretations of prior literature served to “conclusively 
demonstrate” that “facial expressions of emotion” were biological and universal 
(Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972), with the Theory’s extreme rendering of the 
cultural-relativist position “substantially refuted” (Ekman, 1972, p. 210). Despite this 
avowal, the Neurocultural Theory attempted to assimilate cultural influence by carrying 
over Tomkins’s expropriation and modification of the anthropological conception of 
“display rules”—cultural conventions that ostensibly overrode the biological 
expressions (Ekman & Friesen, 1969b). This Wundtian concept was offered to explain 
imperfect results in the original cross-cultural studies, in which participants matched 
posed photos of faces to emotion terms or scenarios (e.g., Ekman, Sorensen, & Friesen, 
1969).  
The criteria required to confirm universality varied. For most BET supporters, 
greater-than-chance matches of facial expressions and later vocalizations, derived 
inductively, to Western emotion terms, approximated via translation, implied 
universality (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Sauter, Eisner, Ekman, & Scott, 2015; Tracy, 
2014; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Haidt and Keltner (1999), however, proposed a more 
stringent criterion beginning at 70%. Critics questioned the theoretical and 
methodological bases for using such arbitrary thresholds to declare the universality of a 
given “facial expression of emotion” (Crivelli & Gendron, 2017; Nelson & Russell, 
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2013; Russell, 1994, 1995). As a ready counterexample, rates of dexterity are roughly 
90% in every human culture, but no one has ever claimed the “universality of 
dexterity;” sinistrality is accepted as consistent variation that is biological, congenital, 
and substantially immutable (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018).  
Although Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory attempted to incorporate roles for both 
nature and nurture in its account of facial expressions, it was rigid in the strict partition 
it made between biology and culture and the respective roles of each. Specifically, the 
Theory held that: (1) because of our common phylogeny, humans shared certain “facial 
expressions of emotion” that expressed those specific emotions, and (2) culture acted to 
supervene on and modify the innate, prototypic expressions (Figure 2).  
_____________________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
_____________________________________________ 
For the Neurocultural Theory, the six original, iconic “facial expressions of 
emotion” had phylogenetic origins and were “hard-wired” in the brain. As such, they 
were expressed and recognized pan-culturally, and were authentic or “felt” expressions 
of interior, basic emotions that erupted spontaneously and often unbidden to the emitter. 
In contrast were those faces that were products of ontogenesis, largely due to cultural 
training or tradition instantiated via “display rules.” Such rules were required to modify 
(e.g., mask, attenuate, dissimulate) the authentic, unruly emotional expressions that 
might disadvantageously erupt in public. The Neurocultural Theory’s use of dramatic, 
even “cartooney” posed expressions in so many of its studies followed directly from the 
Theory itself. The assumption was that because public expressions were typically under 
cultural constraints, those poses “in their very caricatural intensity are among the best 
examples we have of what we would be like if we were alone” (Leys, 2010, p. 77). The 
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Theory’s partition (Figure 2) was parsimonious, but unfortunately, it engendered 
inattention to other possibilities. As we shall see, culture can be a source of 
commonality, and biological inheritance a source of variation (Crivelli & Fridlund, 
2018).  
The Neurocultural Theory Becomes A Moving Target 
Following the original exposition of the provisions of the Neurocultural Theory 
(Ekman, 1972), the theory has shifted in major ways. We grant, of course, that all 
theories should change with the evidence, but from our careful reading of BET writings, 
changes to the Neurocultural Theory and its variations have not been evidence-led. 
Rather, new arguments have replaced older ones with little or no discussion as to what 
new reasoning, or new evidence, justified the changes. 
The problem of qualia. Particularly problematic among BET’s criteria for 
“emotion” is emotional experience or “feelings.” Most emotion researchers recognize 
that qualia cannot—yet, and philosophically perhaps never—be verified empirically. 
Consequently, such researchers cope by using three end-runs around the problem. First, 
participants’ testimony about their experience is used as a proxy, and leveraging a 
journalistic metaphor, that testimony is then termed “self-report.” Second, experimental 
conditions are arranged which the researchers believe will produce the desired qualia, 
with “verification” provided by end-run #1. Finally, some internal or external 
physiological activity is used as a proxy (e.g., limb movements, blushing or blanching, 
heart rate, EEG or fMRI activity), with the choice of measure stipulated theoretically 
and “verified” by concurrent results from end-runs # 2 and/or #1.7 
 One BET proposal grounded in qualia was advanced by Ekman and Friesen 
(1982), who used them to distinguish different kinds of smiles:  
… Another confusing matter is the role of smiling when people lie about 
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their feelings. Can the true smile be distinguished from the false? Or, are 
people misled by smiling expressions, unable to tell how someone really 
feels because of smiling? (p. 240) 
Anchoring any distinction in qualia is always tempting but empirically 
unworkable. Ekman, Davidson, and Friesen (1990) believed they had found a surrogate 
for qualia when they suggested the concepts of “true” or “felt” versus “false” or 
“unfelt” smiles. Smiling with wincing was named the “Duchenne smile.” Such 
Duchenne smiles, because they were supposedly involuntary and could not be faked, 
were therefore authentic and “felt.” “Polite” or appeasing smiles, however, were often 
voluntary and so had to be false and “unfelt.” This distinction, though unprovable 
because it was based on qualia, continues to be accepted uncritically by many 
contemporary researchers (Matsumoto & Willingham, 2009; Niedenthal, Mermillod, 
Maringer, & Hess, 2010; Rychlowska, Cañadas, Wood, Krumhuber, Fischer, & 
Niedenthal, 2014; cf. Fernández-Dols & Carrera, 2011; Fernández-Dols & Crivelli, 
2013). 
Ekman et al. (1990) provided no discriminant validation of their Duchenne-
smile hypothesis, and so the inevitable difficulties with their formulation surfaced in 
later research. Dichotomizing smiles into “true” versus “false” depending on whether 
the emitter was happy not only turned everyday courtesy into mendacity, but it also 
produced puzzling paradoxes when new evidence was gathered (Fridlund, 2017b). First, 
the supposedly authentic Duchenne smiles could be readily faked. Second, these smiles 
occurred equally along with “non-Duchenne” smiles under conditions when 
“happiness” was and was not expected. Finally, Duchenne smiles were produced with 
intense but unpleasant stimulation. Fridlund (1994) had earlier suggested that wincing 
was not a marker of qualia, but of response intensity regardless of hedonics, and this 
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suggestion appears confirmed.   
The shifting sands of basic emotions. The most basic shifts occurred in the 
number of emotions that were considered “basic.” The difficulties in pinpointing what 
made an emotion “basic” began early, and they were, and are, readily understandable 
given that “emotion” itself remains consensually undefined. Illustrating the problem, 
Ekman and Friesen gave conflicting lists in two papers published the same year. Ekman, 
Sorenson, and Friesen (1969) listed and used cross-culturally the six basic emotions we 
noted above, whereas Ekman and Friesen (1969a) included interest in their list of 
“seven primary affects states” (p. 97).  
We have searched for some discussion of what led Ekman et al. to place 
“interest” on one list and not the other (for the arbitrary origin of the six initial “basic 
emotions,” see Colombetti, 2014). Perhaps a deeper issue was at stake: how did Ekman 
et al. conceive or reconceive emotion such that the lists differed? In those early writings, 
we found that Ekman et al. (1969) used the terms “emotion,” “affect,” “emotional 
states,” “primary affect” and “affect states” interchangeably, and we found no 
definitions or usages that allowed clear distinctions among the terms.  
 The early 1990s saw unprecedented challenges to BET. Ortony and Turner (1990) 
disputed the integrity of the “basic emotions” concept. To its credit, BET researchers 
responded by issuing lists of inclusion criteria to indicate what constituted emotions and 
particularly “basic emotions.” Unfortunately, these lists of criteria were not only 
imprecise, their construction appeared ad hoc, and some evidence for that conclusion 
lies in the rapidity with which they changed (Bąk, 2016, p. 39). To our knowledge, 
matching exclusion criteria (i.e., what specifically would rule out emotion, or a 
particular emotion) have never been stipulated, rendering any definitive classification 
unworkable. Equally important are lists of inclusion and exclusion criteria for 
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verification of emotion, or a particular emotion, as it occurs or does not occur in real 
time. These efforts, too, have foundered (Durán et al., 2017). 
Normally, one would hope that the list of criteria for basic emotions would 
change to accommodate new evidence or argument, either that certain criteria were 
unjustified and deserved omission, or missing and deserved inclusion. We have been 
unable to find among BET writings such analytical treatment of the grounds by which 
the lists of criteria were altered and the previous criteria were found unsuitable.  
Moving beyond six basic emotions. The list of “basic emotions” naturally 
contracted and expanded with the ever-changing inclusion criteria, and some recent 
BET supporters have claimed to “reveal” new basic emotions by altering the 
fundamental BET criteria that defined them (Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Keltner & 
Cordaro, 2017; Keltner, Tracy, Sauter, Cordaro, & McNeil, 2016; Sauter, 2017; Tracy 
& Randles, 2011).   
Some recent pronouncements of “new” emotions have been accomplished by 
discarding Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) dictum that a characteristic facial expression 
was definitive for an emotion. For Ekman and Friesen (1975), bodily activities like 
postures, gaze direction, and self-touching did not indicate emotion but efforts to cope 
with emotion; as such, those activities could not be criterial.  
Ekman and Friesen’s reasoning has, without any suitable scholarly discussion, 
been bypassed repeatedly by current BET supporters, mostly on utilitarian grounds. 
Keltner and Cordaro (2017) proclaimed that “the scientific study of facial expressions 
has moved significantly beyond static portrayals of six emotions,” and that “focusing on 
more modalities than facial expression alone has enabled the discovery [italics ours] of 
new emotional expressions” (p. 59). But such redefinition in order to “move beyond” 
existing criteria may not be justified. One does not increase the number of dog breeds 
         From BET to BECV         20 
by including cats unless there is evidence or argument to justify grouping the two.  
Finding “new” emotions and expressions. BET researchers have engaged with 
the current positive psychology movement and announced the “discovery” of 
expressions for the so-called self-conscious emotions (e.g., shame, pride, guilt) and 
some positive ones (e.g., love, compassion), which they suggest have special relevance 
to health, well-being, personal development and even ethical actions, cooperative 
societies, and “global compassion” (Dalai Lama & Ekman, 2008; Keltner, 2009; 
Keltner, Marsh, & Smith, 2010). 
The hypothetical expression of “pride” presents familiar criterial issues. One 
team of BET researchers proposed that a “head up, eyes down” posture signified pride 
(Keltner & Cordaro, 2017; Shiota, Campos, & Keltner, 2003). In contrast, another BET 
team argued that the “universal expression of pride” included an “expanded posture,” 
backward head tilt, arms akimbo, and smiling without wincing (Tracy, 2016; Tracy & 
Robins, 2004). These two purported expressions were wholly different but both were 
suggested to be phylogenetic and universal. 
Nothing in biological or cultural evolutionary theory precludes two pride 
displays, but we have found no serious discussion among BET researchers regarding 
whether this is so, and if so, how both evolved and when or where they each might 
occur. Both BET research teams assume phylogenetic origination of their iconic and 
universal representations of pride. However, the only feature common to these two 
prototypes of “pride”—the head tilted back—may easily arise ontogenetically from 
“look at me” gestures directed toward caretakers by children (Fridlund, 2018). Here 
again, neither Keltner nor Tracy took time to consider Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) 
stipulation that a distinctive facial expression was prerequisite for such a “basic” 
emotion as pride. We observed a similar silence on this issue from Keltner and Shiota 
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(2003) in their response to a litany of suggested new emotions proposed by Rozin and 
Cohen (2003). 
We are not judging the validity of Ekman and Friesen’s (1975) declaration, of 
course, only the inattention among BET researchers toward it. This state of affairs might 
lead cynics to conclude that BET has evolved more by successive proclamations than 
new evidence or argument. Yet another patent example returns us to recent disavowals 
by BET proponents of qualia as essential to definitions of emotion (Beck, 2015; Ekman, 
2017; Keltner & Cordaro, 2017). Although Ekman and Friesen’s felt/false smile 
distinction was “anchored” in qualia, Ekman (cited by Beck, 2015) stated, “If [self-
report] is the method that’s used, I won’t read the article.” Following a similar 
disavowal, Keltner announced the “capture” of 27 new “distinct categories of emotion” 
based neither on facial expressions nor bodily actions, but solely on self-report (Cowen 
& Keltner, 2017). By our reading, Keltner did not square the position he advanced in 
Keltner and Cordaro (2017) with the seemingly contradictory one he relied upon that 
same year in Cowen and Keltner (2017).  
In sum, despite the many inconsistencies entailed in these recent 
announcements, relevant BET supporters lauded their own findings of “new” emotions 
as powerful extensions to both Darwin’s Expression and Ekman’s Neurocultural Theory 
(Keltner, Tracy, Sauter, Cordaro, & McNeil, 2016). As we shall see when discussing 
BECV, such extensions (e.g., Keltner & Cordaro, 2017) are destined to fail because 
they are based on superseded theories and conceptualizations of animal communication 
and evolutionary biology (Al-Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, & Buss, 2016; Fischer, 
2017; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Waller, Whitehouse, & Micheletta, 2017). 
BET’s Twin Escape Clauses: Blends and Display Rules  
Two BET concepts have lent it an unusual ability to accommodate evidence that 
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departs from its own predictions. Critics might term these “escape clauses,” and they 
have accompanied all stages in BET’s evolution. They are the notions of “blends” and 
cultural “display rules.” It appears from BET writings that both are used to account for 
shortfalls and unpredicted results in BET research, as well as to claim relevance to 
applied science (Ekman, 2016; Martinez, 2017; Matsumoto, Frank, & Hwang, 2013). 
We believe and hope to show that both these conceptions are ad hoc, and likely make 
certain BET predictions unfalsifiable.  
Blends. According to the Neurocultural Theory, and taken most directly from 
Tomkins, everyday facial expressions need not always look like the prototypical six 
“facial expressions of emotion” because people might have “blended emotions” 
(Ekman, 1972, 1973; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). According to this proviso, such blended 
emotions may consist of conflictual emotions (the happiness and sadness of 
Schadenfreude or Gluckschmerz), or a transition from one emotion to another (fear 
turning to anger). These blended emotions would produce blended or “compound” faces 
in predictable ways, as explained by an additive model in which the basic-emotion 
constituents would be identifiable within the expression as a whole as either concurrent 
or diachronic composites. This approach is not exclusive to BET. Other affect theories 
have relied on a similar additive approach (for review, see Ortony & Turner, 1990), and 
one team of AI researchers used an additive model to accommodate the variety of 
everyday human facial behavior (e.g., Du, Tao, & Martinez, 2014).  
The first problem with the “blend” model is conceptual, in that it, like prior uses 
in disciplines such as personality psychology, relies on circular reasoning by confusing 
relationships with properties (Boag, 2011). Thus, according to the additive “blend” 
model, facial behavior X is explained by its assumed corresponding emotion Y, which in 
turn can be verified solely by the occurrence of behavior X. Thus, in BET, facial 
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behavior F1 is an “expression” of emotion E1, F2 of E2, etc. Then, if we see facial 
behaviors F1 + F2, then within BET we must conclude that the person is “having” 
emotions E1 + E2. How could we conclude otherwise? Yet how could this conclusion 
ever be justified when the presence neither of E1 nor E2 can be verified independently, 
much less together?  
Indeed, to date, we have seen no reliable evidence that admixed expressions can 
be decoded reliably into admixed emotions, nor that admixed emotions are reliably 
encoded into additively admixed expressions. The same conceptual and verifiability 
problems plague the popular, and popularized, notion of “microexpressions” 
(Matsumoto, Frank, & Hwang, 2013), transient partial expressions that supposedly 
reflect fleeting or “masked” emotions. We have seen no evidence that such transient 
facial movements either reliably encode, or can be reliably decoded to, suppressed or 
fleeting “emotion” (cf. Durán et al., 2017). In contrast, BECV regards these extraneous 
movements as incipient or conflict behaviors, commonly observed in numerous animals 
under conditions of conflict or ambivalence (e.g., Fridlund, 1994). Such explanation 
requires no recourse to BET’s version of Ryle’s ghost—subpersonal events like 
“masked emotions” that are undefinable and therefore unverifiable—but are nonetheless 
granted causal potency. 
Display rules. The second overexplanatory exception to BET’s claim of 
prototypic, evolved “facial expressions of emotion,” was to grant from the outset that 
these iconic expressions were rarely observed. BET’s explanation was that these 
expressions were nearly always modified by culture before they could erupt on the face. 
Indeed, because these expressions were vestigial, Darwinian eruptions, we had to 
manage them preemptively in order to live civilly (Ekman, 1972). Thus, to make the 
claim that “facial expressions of emotion” were produced uniformly and recognized 
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universally, BET immediately had to incorporate a mechanism that accommodated 
failures to support it.  
The Neurocultural Theory contained the postulate that social and cultural 
learning somehow intermediated the neural outflow to the facial muscles before the 
muscles actually contracted. The result was the mitigation, distortion, curtailment, or 
masking of the prototypical expression en passant.8 This “interference system” 
constituted a set of display rules that insured, and explained, variation in facial 
expressions among cultures (Ekman, 1972). It also was used to explain low to moderate 
agreement scores in “recognition” studies. Consequently, facial expressions were 
universal signals of emotion, but sometimes they were not.9 
In the first BET cross-cultural study conducted with indigenous societies, 
displays rules were invoked ad hoc to explain lower-than-expected emotion label/photo 
matching (“recognition”) scores (Ekman, Sorensen, & Friesen, 1969). There was no 
evidence available to support this claim, nor did the authors ever entertain the 
possibility that display rules might instead explain high matching scores. This same 
apparently ad hoc, one-sided use of display rules has been repeated in cross-cultural 
tests of the universality hypothesis in industrialized (e.g., Matsumoto et al., 2002) and 
non-industrialized societies (Tracy & Robins, 2008).  
Experimental evidence to confirm the existence of cultural display rules was 
sought in the study that comprised Wallace Friesen’s unpublished Ph.D. dissertation 
(Friesen, 1972; see Fridlund, 1994, for exposé and critique, and Leys, 2017, for further 
analysis). Friesen, under Ekman’s supervision, compared American vs. Japanese college 
students who watched stressful films in three conditions: (1) alone, (2) while viewing 
with an experimenter, and (3) in a third, divided-attention condition wherein the 
students were interviewed while simultaneously re-viewing the films. Thus, there was 
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one “solitary” condition and two “social” conditions; as such, the conditions straddled 
both sides of the Neuro-Cultural partition (Figure 2). 
As Ekman (1984) consistently interpreted the findings, “in private, when no 
display rules to mask expression were operative, we saw the biologically based, 
evolved, universal facial expressions of emotion…In a social situation, we had shown 
how rules for the management of expression led to culturally different facial 
expressions” (p. 321). This interpretation masked the actual results. Only in the 
Divided-Attention condition did the Japanese and American faces show the differences 
Ekman described (“masking” of negative faces by smiles among the Japanese). In the 
other, more purely social co-viewing condition, the faces of the two groups were 
similar, as they were for solitary viewing.  
Unfortunately, Ekman (1972, 1973, 1980, 1985) repeatedly omitted key details 
of the experiment in his re-tellings, reporting the existence of only two experimental 
conditions and thereby obscuring the results of the two social ones. He consistently 
reported the cultural differences observed in the third, divided-attention condition as 
belonging to the more purely social co-viewing second condition, where there were no 
such differences. Thus, Ekman was able to present the contrast as a solitary one, when 
display rules were inoperative, vs. a social one, in which they were. Ekman only 
recently wrote about the missing second, mere co-viewing condition.  
In Ekman’s (2017) response, he admitted to the previously undisclosed 
condition, but again misreported the conditions participants faced (enumerations ours):   
After [1] watching the films alone, they were then [2] interviewed by a 
graduate student (dressed in a white coat to enhance his authority), and 
then [3] watched the stress films in the presence of that authority 
figure… It is only when they were viewing the very unpleasant films 
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with the authority present that the differences emerged (p. 48) 
Of course, this is not what Friesen (1972) reported in his dissertation. Cultural 
differences in faces emerged not in solitude, nor in the following social condition of 
mere co-viewing, but only in the final condition, a divided-attention one during which 
the interviewer questioned the participants during a final replay. Ekman (2017) 
wondered why Fridlund (1994) hadn’t regarded “the similarity when being interviewed 
as further evidence of universality” (p. 48). The answer is patent. The contrast Ekman 
(1972) posed was between solitary and social conditions; the null finding of no cultural 
differences in the social, mere co-viewing condition does not constitute ad hoc and post 
hoc evidence of universality, but a failure of the experimental prediction. 
In our review of the relevant literature, it appears that, despite the fact that all 
three conditions were revealed over 25 years ago (Fridlund, 1991a, 1994), other BET 
researchers have inexplicably repeated Ekman’s incomplete version of the Japanese-
American study. Ekman’s recounting still prevails among contemporary users of the 
display-rules construct (e.g., Matsumoto & Hwang, 2013; Matsumoto, Willingham, & 
Olide, 2009). For instance, Matsumoto and Hwang (2013) stated, “their existence 
[display rules] was demonstrated in Friesen’s (1972) study, in which the Japanese were 
more likely than the American participants to mask their negative emotions in the 
presence of a higher status experimenter but not when alone” (p. 356).10 This flawed 
account has been repeated in  emotion handbooks and reviews by BET and non-BET 
researchers alike (e.g., Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Keltner & Ekman, 2000; Martin & 
Carlson, 2019; Matsumoto, 2001; Niedenthal & Ric, 2017; Parkinson, Fischer, & 
Manstead, 2005; Shiota & Kalat, 2017). As we shall see, it has permeated many Psych 1 
textbooks as well. 
Misreporting aside, in hindsight it is clear that the study could never have 
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succeeded. The reasons lie in how “cultural display rules” were defined. Specifically, 
any determination of their operation would require that: (1) individuals from different 
cultures have the same emotions but produce different faces, (2) the facial expressions 
would be identical in their neurological instigation but modified in their final 
expression, and (3) those differences in faces result not from biology but enculturation. 
None of these requirements was satisfied in the Japanese-American study, and we 
suggest that none could be.  
Verifying the first condition may be impossible because emotion is not 
consensually definable or measurable. Even stipulating this, it is nearly inconceivable 
that individuals from two cultures, with different understandings of the conditions of 
measurement, would have identical emotions within those conditions. Japanese and 
American students can be expected to differ not only in their facial expressions, but also 
in their attitudes to authority, their approaches to being experimental participants, and 
their different perceptions of what it means to watch a film alone and then with another 
person. All these differences would be expected to affect the participants’ emotions 
differentially. Without equal emotions between the two cultures (and how would 
equivalence ever be established?), differences in their faces cannot be attributed to 
intervention by cultural display rules.  
The second claim of neurologically identical instigation with “downstream” 
modification may be impossible to verify because we currently know of no way to 
detect and discern unmodified vs. modified expressions before either appears on the 
face.  
Finally, verifying the final predicate of cultural origination may be just as 
dubious, given that we cannot trace the exact origins of any individual’s facial 
expressions, and those origins will always result from complex interactions of biology 
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and culture (Fridlund, 1991a, 1994; Leys, 2017; Whiten, Ayala, Feldman, & Laland, 
2017).  
The last point on origins is telling. It corroborates BET’s dated and restrictive 
view toward nature and nurture. BET always envisaged culture as diversifying and 
evolution as unifying. This construal was simple, and it provided an easy rubric by 
which to assign roles to both. As modern evolutionary theory progressed, the 
interactions between natural and cultural selection now appear much more complex than 
BET ever allowed (Richerson & Boyd, 2005).   
The Match Game, or Procrustes Revisited 
Darwin (1872/1965) conducted the first cross-cultural research on facial 
expressions to ascertain commonalities among humanity’s expressions. In postal contact 
with his English correspondents all over the world, Darwin sent them survey 
questionnaires which asked about what faces the local peoples made when they were 
possessed of certain “states of mind.” Darwin did not schematize either the expressive 
habits or their associated elicitors. He just noted the reports of his correspondents, one 
after another, in successive chapters of Expression, including nearly thirty “states of 
mind” (e.g., anxiety, dejection, despair, sulkiness, tenderness, devotion, hatred, anger, 
surprise, fear, shame, shyness). Some of these, Darwin suggested, elicited inherited 
habits that were comprised not of faces, or faces alone, but of postures or autonomic 
signs (e.g., blanching, blushing). Darwin contended that the majority of these habits was 
“common to all the races of mankind,” a phrase he repeated throughout Expression.  
Darwin’s cross-cultural research was groundbreaking, but it was mostly 
anecdotal. Both the reports of expressive behaviors and their associated “states of mind” 
were based on testimony by Englishman who presumed to know the ethnographies of 
the cultures on which they informed Darwin. The possibilities for distortion are 
         From BET to BECV         29 
manifold (Crivelli, Jarillo, & Fridlund, 2016; Medin & Bang, 2014). 
Darwin proceeded with a more structured inquiry. He conducted a “free-
response study” using standard faces, with participants free to give any description of 
each face (for a detailed description of this study, see Snyder, Kaufman, Harrison, & 
Maruff, 2010). Darwin, who had corresponded with Duchenne and obtained rights to 
reproduce some of his roughly 60 photographs of faradically stimulated faces, intuited 
which of these looked “the most characteristic” (see letter to Dr. James Crichton-
Browne, cited in Snyder et al., 2010). He settled on 11 photos and compiled lists of the 
responses to each made by 24 houseguests at his Down House residence. Such free-
response methods were extended by Langfeld (1917) and Allport (1924).  
Darwin’s home study was single-blind, used poses he preselected, and assayed 
largely English participants. It is debatable whether it could have been more informative 
than his prior surveys. How, then, did BET hope to verify its claims that humans 
worldwide experience the same emotions, and then express them the same way? Despite 
methodological attempts to address the problem of equivalence (Matsumoto & van de 
Vijver, 2011), we return yet again to the trivial observation that this question is 
empirically unanswerable because qualia remain unverifiable.  
BET researchers attempted to bypass this issue by employing simple matching-
to-sample studies in which proxies were substituted for both the emotions and the 
expressive behaviors. Typically, still photos of faces substituted for facial behaviors in 
situ as per Darwin, Langfeld, and Allport. Now, restricted lists of emotion words—
typically the same numbers as the faces—substituted for the emotions. The emotion 
words were always selected from the English lexicon by the Western researchers and 
then translated if necessary for the field. The face photos were best-guess matches to 
those words, as selected by those same researchers. In a kind of circular but perhaps 
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inescapable logic, “matches” between the emotion terms and the still photos were taken 
to confirm the “basicness” and “universality” of both: (1) the facial behavior freeze-
framed by the photos, and (2) the emotions “read out” by them. 
The direct forerunner of the “famous” BET studies used a design similar to that 
devised by Allport 40 years earlier (Allport, 1924, p. 223). Tomkins and McCarter 
(1964) conducted a matching-to-sample study in which participants matched photos of 
posed facial expressions to words representing each of Tomkins’s primary affects. Like 
Darwin, Tomkins picked the photos to represent prototypical exemplars of each affect, 
and then provided names for the affects, so the result unsurprisingly was self-
confirming (Russell, 1994). 
This type of study, with its more-or-less foregone conclusion, became the 
template for the studies that first popularized BET: the cross-cultural matching-to-
sample studies conducted by Paul Ekman and Carroll Izard (Ekman & Friesen, 1971; 
Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969; Izard, 1971). The photos were said to be of 
“emotional expressions,” and matching scores for photos to either emotion terms or 
stories were termed “recognition scores,” because participants were assumed to have 
recognized emotion “in” the faces rather than having picked among forced-choice 
ascriptions. The methods used and evidence gathered in small-scale, indigenous 
societies lent the status of “settled science” to BET since the 1970s (Matsumoto et al., 
2008; Keltner & Ekman, 2000; Keltner et al., 2016), but such studies are now under fire 
for making these assumptions and a host of other issues. Most telling are contrary 
findings obtained by testing participants from small-scale societies, or by using 
psychophysical methods to model mental representations of those facial displays 
labeled “expressions of basic emotions.” 
New evidence gathered in African and Melanesian societies, using more 
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sophisticated and diverse research designs and rigorous data analytical techniques, did 
not confirm the BET proposition that humans pan-culturally “recognize” basic emotions 
from the predicted “facial expressions of emotion” (Crivelli, Jarillo, Russell, & 
Fernández-Dols, 2016; Crivelli, Russell, Jarillo, & Fernández-Dols, 2016; Crivelli, 
Russell, Jarillo, & Fernández-Dols, 2017; Crivelli, Jarillo, Fernández-Dols, & Russell, 
2018; Gendron, Roberson, van der Vyver, & Barrett, 2014). Moreover, agnostic, data-
driven psychophysical methods (e.g., reverse correlations) used with educated European 
and East Asian college students failed to support BET’s claim of the universality of 
“facial expressions of emotion” (Jack, Garrod, Yu, Caldara, & Schyns, 2012; Jack & 
Schyns, 2017). 
BET Goes Ev-Psych and Swaps Emotion Concepts 
BET initially espoused the early “passion” view of emotion. The “Facial Affect 
Program” of the Neurocultural Theory (Ekman, 1972) fired off patterns to the face 
keyed to our emotions, and those spontaneous, eruptive patterns were indicants of our 
reflexive predispositions (i.e., Darwin’s Principle of Serviceable Associated Habits; 
Darwin, 1872/1965). However, those displays were now vestigial, and we needed 
cultural display rules to mitigate them (Fridlund, 2017a).11 
Directly following attacks on the “basic-emotion” concept spearheaded by 
Ortony and Turner (1990), and on the reflexology of Darwin’s Expression by Fridlund 
(1992b), the Neurocultural Theory began to discard its foundation in Darwin and adopt 
a replacement view of emotion (Ekman, 1992), an evolutionary-psychology view 
propounded by Tooby and Cosmides (1990). On this view, reminiscent of early 20th 
century functional accounts, emotions were no longer vestigial reflexes that produced 
eruptive faces; they were organized, strategic motivations that arose in our Pleistocene 
“Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness” (EEA). Thus, in earlier versions of BET, 
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cultures had to evolve display rules to manage our troublesome vestigial Darwinian 
expressions. In Ekman’s post-1992 version of BET, expressions were not strictly once-
serviceable, but may be serviceable now.  
Although it is understood within the Tooby-Cosmides formulation that what 
evolved in the hypothetical EEA may not be currently adaptive (in a reproductive sense, 
necessarily), we have found no demonstration that any facial display, or set of displays, 
has measurable reproductive repercussions. Thus, arguments about the “adaptiveness” 
of emotions or their expressions have tended to be the “it makes sense that evolution 
would have” variety, drawn not from natural history but our speculation about it from 
our current point of retrospection (e.g., Tracy, Randles, & Steckler, 2015). Nonetheless, 
arguments that facial displays are adaptations (e.g., Schmidt & Cohn, 2001) have major 
implications for BET theorizing, because they undercut the need for cultural display 
rules, unless one speculates that they were adaptations but are no longer, which is a 
reversion to Darwin’s position in Expression. 
Most of the current theoretical confusion comes from BET supporters using 
facial displays (i.e., overt behaviors) as proxies for emotions, which, again, are 
consensually undefinable. Thus, defining emotions as “adaptations to solve everyday 
problems” leads many BET researchers to assume that the “expressions” of those 
emotions are part of those problem-solving adaptations (e.g., Shariff & Tracy, 2011). 
For Al-Shawaf, Conroy-Beam, Asao, and Buss (2016), an evolutionary account need 
not imply that if emotions are “evolved solutions to problem-solving tasks,” then they 
must have distinctive, universal signals.12 And if emotions are adaptations to “solve 
everyday problems,” the Tooby-Cosmides view offered no distinction between emotion 
and other traits that evolved to aid problem-solving, such as intelligence, attention, 
motivation, and muscular coordination. Nor did it provide any basis for restricting 
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telltale facial expressions just to “emotions.” 
BET Faces the New Millennium 
The Demise of Display Rules 
In the early 1990’s, new findings began to show that people’s facial behavior 
was altered not only by those who were physically present, but also by those believed to 
be nearby or imagined to be present (see review by Fridlund, 1994, and detailed 
discussion below). The demonstrations of these “implicit audience effects” had 
unanticipated ramifications for the BET notion of “cultural display rules,” which relied 
crucially on presumptions about solitary faces (Fridlund, 1991b, 1994). The new 
evidence on implicit audience effects showed that sociality impacted even solitary 
behavior, undermining Ekman’s assertion that his solitary condition was, by its nature, 
culture-free. How could the Neurocultural Theory accommodate these findings when 
culture, via display rules only influenced public facial behavior? 
To his credit, Ekman (1997) presented a breathtaking change to the 
Neurocultural Theory, whose importance was first noted by historian Ruth Leys 
(personal communication to A. J. Fridlund, March 4, 2015). In perhaps the most 
significant change since the Theory’s inception, Ekman suggested: 
“I expect that some display rules are so well established that some people 
may follow them even when they are alone. And some people when 
alone may imagine the reactions of others, and then follow the 
appropriate display rule, as if the others were present. And finally, there 
may be display rules that specify the management of expression not just 
with others but when alone" (p. 328). 
As Leys also discovered (personal communication to A. J. Fridlund, September 
2, 2015), the seeds of this development were evident in the Neurocultural Theory as 
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early as 1982, when “miserable smiles” were noted among solitary participants yet, with 
no evident awareness of the contradiction, were still considered “masking” social faces 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; for discussion, see Leys, 2017, pp. 188-119).  
This dramatic admission solved one problem, but it opened up far bigger ones. It 
offered no method by which to ascertain when such solitary display rules were in effect 
and when they were not. Furthermore, the social-solitary contrast on which the 
Japanese-American experiment relied now afforded no solution. 
There were bigger implications than verifiability. Prior to this change, Ekman 
contended that solitary facial behavior was free of display rules, and the viability of the 
only empirical evidence for cultural display rules depended on this premise. With 
Ekman’s expansion of BET to include solitary display rules, could it now be certain that 
the solitary faces observed in the Japanese-American study were display-rule-free and 
thus “biologically based, evolved, universal facial expressions of emotion”? If so, how 
would that be verified? Thus far, neither Ekman nor other BET supporters have offered 
any way to answer this question. Thus, researchers who use “cultural display rules” as a 
default explanation for cultural variation in facial displays appear to have lost their only 
evidence to support that claim. 
In the face of Ekman’s (1997) own undermining of the Japanese-American 
experiment and its status as the only empirical evidence for display rules, what has 
happened to BET’s position on them? Our reading suggests that “display rules” are still 
widely studied within BET. Likewise, the misreporting of the Japanese-American 
experiment and BET concept of display rules proceeds not only within professional 
outlets, but it remains standard fare in most introductory psychology textbooks (e.g., 
Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011; Gilovich, Keltner, Chen, & 
Nisbett, 2016; Martin & Carlson, 2019).  
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How have “display rules” survived when the evidence for them has been 
vitiated? Just as we observed earlier with the shifting criteria for “basic emotions,” the 
display-rules enterprise has thrived because of a shift in the definition of display rules 
themselves. Display rules within BET are no longer studied as neurological mechanisms 
that intermediate the eruption of expressions. They are perceptions of what behaviors 
different cultures permit and disallow, as judged by the self-reports of individuals 
within those cultures. The result of this wholesale redefinition is a proliferation of 
questionnaire-based, correlational surveys that rely on popular, yet problematic, cross-
national value scales (e.g., Koopmann-Holm & Matsumoto, 2011). By our reading, this 
fundamental redefinition of “display rules” has gone unacknowledged in the BET 
literature, most conspicuously among display-rules researchers themselves.  
A critic might remark acerbically that “cultural display rules” have become a 
counterfeit construct passed off as the original but nothing like it. Certainly, there are 
reasons for skepticism (e.g., Fernández-Dols, 1999; Leys, 2017; Parkinson, 2005; 
Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernández-Dols, 2003).  
BET’s Last Stand? 
Ekman’s (1997, 2017) announcement of solitary display rules, in our opinion, 
had crucial and perhaps fatal implications not only for the display rules concept, but for 
many of BET’s founding tenets. We count three: 
1. The notion of private display rules drew Basic Emotions Theory much closer 
to the ground staked out by the “relativists,” which the Theory contested and claimed it 
had refuted. Ironically, those relativists were actually saying what Ekman now 
proposed; i.e., a culture’s rituals and traditions are able to permeate all aspects of its 
members’ lives (Fridlund, 2017b).  
2. When social conventions about facial conduct can pervade the private sphere, 
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it became uncertain whether any of the faces observed in the solitary condition of the 
Japanese-American experiment were untainted eruptions of emotion. This eroded the 
Neurocultural “partition” assumed in that experiment: private faces had to be authentic 
emotional expressions, untainted by culture, but social faces were tailored for public 
consumption. To us, this leaves stranded the concept of “authentic” emotional 
expressions. Where, if not in solitude, would one ever observe them? 
 3. Ekman’s announcement would appear to undercut his own prior rationale for 
using photographed poses in his cross-cultural studies. Originally, BET supporters 
agreed that posed expressions were the best exemplars of those spontaneous, authentic, 
culture-free “expressions of emotions” that typically occurred in private. Now that 
solitary faces were permeable to culture, could it be certain that the largely Western 
posed photos used in those cross-cultural studies represented culture-free expressions? 
The Behavioral Ecology View of Facial Displays  
We would like to suggest an alternative account of facial behavior, one that grew 
out of the simple acknowledgment that the Lorenz-Tinbergen “tripwire” view of animal 
signaling, on which BET was based, had been superseded. Animals were no longer seen 
as reflexive responders but as skilled negotiators that used graded, context-dependent 
signals in social negotiation (e.g., Smith, 1977). This meant that animals were being 
granted more sophistication in their signaling behavior than humans as seen by BET 
(Fridlund, 1994, 2017a).   
Let us suggest an alternative history. Imagine that in the 1960s, facial behavior 
researchers had not begun with preconceptions about what faces “expressed” or how 
they were used, and about the originating roles of biology and culture. What if they had 
not assumed that all cultures share our conceptions of emotion? What if they had not 
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used self-confirmatory methods but developed more data-driven approaches? And what 
if they had not traveled the planet dead-set on showing universality? 
This tack, we believe, would have led us deeper into those cultures’ specific 
understandings of their facial behaviors. For example, using a data-driven approach, we 
could have built a huge database of facial and nonfacial behavior and how each culture 
used them (Jack, Crivelli, & Wheatley, 2018). Those interested in “emotion” might 
have pursued agnostic inquiries regarding whether diverse cultures packaged their 
experiences and behaviors the way Westerners do, and connected those packages to 
facial expressions as BET theorists do today. 
A Functional Account of Facial Behavior 
The Behavioral Ecology View of facial displays (BECV) was formulated in the 
early 1990s as a way to enable this kind of reboot of the study of our facial displays in 
ways that freed them from their presumed intimacy with emotion and the incumbent 
entanglements. BECV, by being externalist and functionalist, was able to reconnect the 
study of human facial displays with evidence from contemporary evolutionary biology 
and studies of animal communication (Fridlund, 1991a, 1994, 1997).15 It provides an 
agnostic framework for studying our facial behavior with minimal constraints or 
preconceptions. 
BET was an intrapsychic theory in which hypothetical neuromodular 
mechanisms were responsible for facial behavior and produced it iconically and 
universally. For BECV, in contrast, facial behavior and our sensitivity to it are flexible 
tools that have co-evolved because they allowed the modification of the behavioral 
trajectories of social interactants in ways beneficial overall to both parties (Fridlund, 
1992b, 2017b). The co-evolution could occur via natural or cultural selection, and 
because either could produce uniformity or diversity, BECV is open and agnostic as to 
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whether there are “universal” facial behaviors apart from those that aid regulatory 
functions, like eyeblinks, tears, yawns, burps, coughs, sneezes, or nasal aversion (e.g., 
with trigeminal irritation to ammonia) (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018; Fridlund, 1994). 
 BECV proponents discount the ideas that faces have fixed morphologies with 
invariant meanings, or that they have meanings inviolably linked to specifiable 
subpersonal states. Rather, facial displays are “social tools” that have meanings within 
interactions that depend on the interactants, their aims within the interactions, and the 
proximal and historical contexts of their interactions (Table 1). The flexibility of tool 
uses and context-dependency that BECV predicates for our facial behavior are well 
supported by Bayesian models of phenotypic flexibility developed by contemporary 
evolutionary biologists (Richerson, 2019).     
_____________________________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here. 
_____________________________________________ 
Thus, for BECV, what is important about faces is not what they are theorized 
intrapsychically to “reflect” or “express,” or by what hypothetical mechanisms they are 
produced, but how they function in social interactions. In other words, our faces are not 
about us, but about you, and what we would like you to do. They, like our words and 
our nonfacial communicative behaviors, are ways we change our social trajectories. 
Audience Effects  
As we noted earlier, BECV was influential in questioning the strict private-
public distinction embedded in the Neurocultural partition (Figure 2). The sanctity of 
that distinction, and the different kinds of facial expressions assigned to it was the 
linchpin that supported the entirety of the Japanese-American experiment.  
The distinction was obviated in studies by Fridlund and his colleagues on 
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audience effects that extended novel avian research (Marler, Duffy, & Pickert, 1986a, 
1986b). These studies demonstrated audience effects in solitary smiling with audiences 
that were both explicit (friends were present) and implicit (participants were alone but 
believed friends were co-participants elsewhere), and with social vs. nonsocial imagery 
(Fridlund 1991b; Fridlund, Kenworthy, & Jaffey, 1992; Fridlund, Sabini, Hedlund, 
Schaut, Shenker, & Knauer, 1990). These findings showed that the mere psychological 
presence of others could modify the facial displays of solitary subjects. Other 
investigators then replicated such implicit audience effects, expanding the findings to 
infants, beyond smiling, and to augmenting vs. decrementing effects of friends vs. 
strangers (Hess, Banse, & Kappas, 1995; Jones, Collins, & Hong, 1991; Schützwohl & 
Reisenzein, 2012; Wagner & Smith, 1991). 
 Other solitary faces reflect implicit interactions we have with inanimate objects, 
like soda machines that won’t give us our change, or computers that spontaneously 
reboot. The curse words we sometimes utter toward these defiant objects demonstrate 
that, in those moments, we have given them agency and a sensorium. Fridlund (1994) 
and Crivelli and Fridlund (2018) itemized some common examples of faces that are 
solitary but implicitly social (e.g., those made while praying to God or calling out for 
help).  
Participants in any psychological experiment were seen, in effect, as actors in a 
drama. In turn, the experimenters were seen as the directors of the scene. Finally, the 
role of “experimental participant” itself was conceptualized as a cultural norm that 
would be in place even when the subject was alone on the experimental stage (i.e., the 
video viewing room; Fridlund, 1991a, 1994). These conclusions were consistent with 
the massive data collected in the earlier wave of findings on experimental “demand 
characteristics” (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1992), many of which are readily interpretable 
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as explicit and implicit audience effects. 
From all these findings, the distinction between solitary (culture free) vs. social 
conditions relied upon by BET to demonstrate display rules began to appear 
unsustainable.  
A Modern View of Biological and Cultural Evolution  
Despite over 50 years of advances in our understanding of the varied, interactive 
contributions of genetic, epigenetics, and enculturation to human diversity (Crivelli & 
Fridlund, 2018), we have found no indication that BET advocates have advanced 
beyond the dichotomous Neurocultural partition proposed by Ekman and Friesen in the 
1960s (Figure 2). BET’s research agenda still promotes “new” universal expressions of 
emotion using problematic “recognition” techniques and then claims that high rater 
agreements across societies imply biological origins (e.g., Keltner, Tracy, Sauter, 
Cordaro, & McNeil, 2016). Likewise, BET researchers continue to attribute variance 
from their universalist predictions to enculturation via the ad hoc invocation of “display 
rules” or analogous mechanisms.  
For example, one recent study examined the heterogeneity of “long-history 
migration” (i.e., prevalence of non-indigenous peoples) within 35 cultures as a possible 
determinant of variation in the frequency of “emotionally expressive behavior,” and the 
use of smiles specifically (Rychlowska et al., 2015; also see Niedenthal, Rychlowska, 
Wood, & Zhao, 2018). Migratory heterogeneity was assessed only over the last 500 
years, an instant in the 70,000-year migratory flow of Homo sapiens out of Africa. 
Nonetheless, 500 years is time enough to permit assessment not only of cultural but also 
epigenetic modes of inheritance, which were not acknowledged. The study assumed 
from the outset that any differences would indicate “norms guiding emotional 
expressivity” and “the use of the smile to solve problems of social living” (Rychlowska 
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et al., 2015). Despite its self-description, the study did not examine cultural diversity in 
facial behavior, only questionnaire behavior, obtained when members were asked for 
their beliefs about their own cultures. Boccagni and Baldassar (2015) provided a useful 
orientation to the complexity of migration studies and emotions, variously defined, and 
noted the limitations of such “closed-ended” survey methods in formulating and 
interpreting those studies. 
One cannot infer either that commonality implicates biology whereas diversity 
implicates culture (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018). Money is universal, but money is not 
genetic. Blood hemoglobin types are diverse and regionally dispersed, but blood types 
are not cultural (Fridlund, 1994). Thus, natural selection can, depending upon the 
circumstance, result in both: (1) uniformity via convergence, and (2) diversity via well-
established mechanisms like adaptive radiation, genetic drift, founder effects, epigenetic 
markers, and/or a host of other factors. Likewise, cultural factors may account for: (1) 
commonalities via migration and convergent cultural evolution, as well as (2) diversity 
due to ecological, political and historical influences specific to the culture (Fridlund, 
2017a).  
Studies within cultural phylogenetics have established mechanisms of cultural 
selection, analogous to those in natural selection, and their proper methods of inquiry 
(Mace & Holden, 2005; Mendoza-Straffon, 2016). Differences in population density, 
mortality likelihood, sex ratios, and resource availability and predictability, may 
influence individuals across societies to differ morphologically and behaviorally within 
programmed contours in the alteration of gene expression (Sng, Neuberg, Varnum, & 
Kenrick, 2018). 
Unlike BET, BECV has no interest in presupposing that any facial display might 
be or should be universal, because the outcome is low-stakes, implying neither 
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biological nor cultural origins, nor any specified interaction of the two. These days, 
whether or not certain facial expressions of “emotion” are universal bears mostly on 
issues like travel, trade, and territory, not human nature. The exact origins of any 
morphology or behavior can be ascertained only after painstaking assays of a range of 
possible contributors, using a host of varied methods. Although they may be 
informative about current states of affairs, origins and evolutionary paths don’t follow 
from a few matching-to-sample experiments or questionnaire surveys. 
Because BECV’s emphasis is functionalist, its focus is how we use our faces in 
everyday life, and this kind of inquiry is entirely external. For BECV advocates, 
explaining our facial behavior using unverifiable, subpersonal constructs like emotion is 
a wasteful diversion, because what I do with my face is best explained by what you do 
with yours. Our faces, like our words, are ways of influencing our interaction 
trajectories with others. Given this emphasis, most BECV studies have relied on 
observational designs conducted in laboratory or natural settings (Fernández-Dols & 
Crivelli, 2013; Reisenzein, Studtmann, & Horstmann, 2013). 
Since BET’s inception, researchers have focused their efforts on a romanticized, 
semantic approach to facial behavior, in which that behavior has iconic “content” that 
must be conveyed for communication to occur. That fundamental misunderstanding has 
resulted in self-confirming theorizing and hypothesis-testing that, while amenable to 
laboratory study, never achieved escape velocity from BET’s presuppositions. 
As long as certain facial behaviors are termed “facial expressions of emotion,” 
BET researchers are not free to test the strength of the link between those behaviors and 
emotion. As long as BET researchers use “emotion” without deciding what they mean, 
then the link they claim will never be determined. As long as face-to-emotion-term, 
matching-to-sample tasks are labeled tests of emotion “recognition,” then BET 
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researchers are stuck with a semantic view of facial behavior that can never be open to 
question. And as long as “universality” is considered commensurate with biology, then 
BET will never advance beyond 20th century, outdated understandings of biology and 
culture (Bender, Hutchins, & Medin, 2010; Richerson, 2019; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).  
We believe that the future of the field does not rest on expanding a “grammar of 
the face” that relies on problematic theorizing and questionable data and methods. 
Because BECV stresses the context-sensitivity of facial behavior in interaction 
(Fernández-Dols & Carroll, 1997; Hassin, Aviezer, & Bentin, 2013), it also faces major 
challenges. The complexity of everyday verbal and nonverbal communication does not 
allow easy reduction to the kinds of basic rules and categories of production and 
attribution enshrined in BET. What BECV offers is a framework that recognizes and 
aligns with that complexity at its own level, without retreat to explanation via prior 
categorization and interior causation. 
Foundational experiments and observational studies have shown BECV quite 
useful in understanding neglected and counterintuitive instances of facial behavior. 
State-of-the-art data-driven, inductive methods using big data gleaned from social 
interaction scenarios, will allow a much deeper understanding, and more useful 
modeling—whether of interpersonal or human-AI interaction—of how, when, with 
whom, and to what ends we deploy the powerful “social tools” we have in our facial 
behavior (Crivelli & Fridlund, 2018; Fernández-Dols, 2017). 
Conclusion 
The last 60 years saw the advent and evolution of Basic Emotions Theory, still 
the most popular theory of emotion and of the facial expressions it considered integral 
(Ekman, 2016). It was a theory designed to split the difference between nativist and 
cultural-relativist accounts by which emotions and facial expressions were products of 
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evolution vs. enculturation, respectively. It assimilated the longstanding Western, 
Cartesian account of numerable, categorical emotions, and rode the globalist Zeitgeist 
of the 1970s to promote a uniformitarian ideology regarding certain specific “basic 
emotions” and the “expressions of emotion” they were held to produce.   
In this article, we have summarized what we see as incoherencies embedded in 
the core precepts of BET, as well as numerous contradictions that have accrued over its 
evolution. Our review of the BET literature suggests that: (1) these problems have 
largely gone unnoticed or unremarked; and (2) successive pronouncements of new 
emotions, new criteria for emotions and basic emotions, and new redefinitions of terms 
like “emotion” and “display rules” have been received without recognition, analysis, 
and evaluation of the changes, even when those pronouncements have mooted or 
contradicted previous BET understandings.  
It can be argued that all theories contain the kinds of internal contradictions and 
escape clauses that we have found in BET. This may be true, but we are puzzled why 
BET writings have been so inattentive to them and uneager to address them. We are also 
puzzled by the lack of normal and desirable scientific skepticism accorded BET by 
other psychologists since its inception. We offer some possible explanations for BET’s 
uncritical acceptance: 
First, BET’s view of emotion is distinctly the Western “received wisdom,” and 
the vast majority of BET researchers and onlookers are Westerners who have little 
direct acquaintance with diverse non-industrialized societies and their conceptions and 
rituals, except as seen through a Western, BET lens (Crivelli, Jarillo, & Fridlund, 2016). 
Among these Western preconceptions is the assumption that “emotions,” however 
defined, are linked inextricably to facial expressions, even though the evidence suggests 
otherwise (Durán, Reisenzein, & Fernández-Dols, 2017). The acceptance of that linkage 
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as “settled science” in defiance of the evidence is confirmed by the near-total overlap of 
articles citing “emotion” or “facial expression” published over the last century (Figure 
1). We wonder how our knowledge might have proceeded if the two had begun as 
separate research areas, with the relations between the two a third area of study.  
Second, BET is simplistic, and so researchers in other areas like social 
psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and AI have been able to show “due diligence” by 
using BET’s prescribed iconic faces and matching emotion terms, without delving into 
the real-world diversity and subtlety of emotion concepts and facial behavior. 
Finally, the uniformitarianism at BET’s core is still presented as a hopeful 
Aquarian view in which universal, shared emotions are a gateway to global peace, 
understanding, and compassion (e.g., Keltner, 2009). BET is still the sole account of 
emotions and facial expressions in most Psychology 1 textbooks. During preschool, 
most children worldwide are taught that certain iconic faces have univocal meanings 
using colorful wall posters with cartooney faces and that culture’s emotion words. 
These are faces and emotions that are supposedly universal and phylogenetic and 
shouldn’t need to be taught at all.  
In the present paper, we chose not to focus on problems like the indefinability of 
emotion, or cultural conceptions of emotion, which vex BET and non-BET emotion 
researchers and theorists alike. These have been suitably treated elsewhere, many times. 
Nor have we engaged in a critical review of evidence on any one topic. We have 
focused instead on what we believe are instances of illogic, incoherence, and frank 
contradiction within BET itself. Many of these were present during BET’s initial 
theorizing, and have accumulated since its inception. They include: (1) a simplistic and 
antiquated view of biology-culture interactions, (2) a set of dichotomies, reflected in the 
Neurocultural partition (Figure 2), that is no longer sustainable, (3) a set of shifting 
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criteria and concepts by which findings are obtained and interpreted, and (4) a limited 
awareness of how broadly and deeply culture pervades our concepts, beliefs, and 
experiences. 
 Finally, we showed how modern evolutionary and functional accounts, such as the 
Behavioral Ecology View of facial displays, provide a useful alternative for researchers 
who share our view of BET’s limitations. Our goal is not to supplant one orthodoxy by 
another. Rather, we hope to offer an open, reasonable framework grounded in 
contemporary findings in biological and cultural evolution, animal signaling, and 
human nonverbal communication. For decades, researchers have tendentiously linked 
murky, undefined intrapsychic processes to facial movements to resolve a mystery of 
their own construction, “What do our facial expressions express?” From our 
functionalist standpoint, this essentialist, semantic approach to facial behavior has been 
wasteful and tangential (for a similar critique from a pragmatic approach, see 
Fernández-Dols, 2017). The research question, we suggest, should be, “What do our 
facial behaviors do for us?” 
Footnotes 
1 Throughout this chapter, we use facial behavior or facial display following the 
ethological tradition. On occasion, we use the term “expression” out of tradition, but 
without the implication that facial behaviors transmit any “content.” 
2 Unless otherwise stated, whenever we use the term “emotion,” it denotes “the 
construal of that term within that particular research.” Thus, it should not be assumed 
that “emotion” as used in one study or line of research is the same construct, or refers to 
the same set of behaviors, used in the next. 
3 LeBrun’s depictions of the passions lie at the heart of BET, and via their insinuation 
into Basic Emotion Theories, they became ubiquitous in psychology and neuroscience. 
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Indeed, skeptical approaches to these iconic Western representations of the passions are 
regarded by some BET advocates as anti-Darwinian or non-evolutionary (Ekman, 2017; 
Izard, 1971; Tracy, 2014). 
4 Lamarckian use-inheritance was popular during Charles Darwin’s time, and Darwin 
invoked it throughout Expression. It is now considered untenable. Note that inheritance 
through usage was required for Lamarckian transmission–unlike epigenetic marking, a 
mechanism for within-lifespan acquisition of heritable traits (Armstrong, 2014). 
5 In Tomkins’s theoretical hermeneutics, (1) the “affects” were the bodily responses and 
the expressions, (2) the awareness of affect was the “feeling,” and (3) the feeling 
embedded in the context of memories of prior similar feelings was the “emotion.” These 
distinctions largely dropped out of subsequent BET formulations, which regarded “basic 
emotions” as hermetic packages which might be modulated by drives or triggered by 
memories. 
6 Tracy and Randles (2011) highlighted four BET “models” and invited their 
representative supporters to a special issue of Emotion Review dedicated to BET 
(Ekman & Cordaro, 2011; Izard, 2011; Levenson, 2011; Panksepp & Watt, 2011). 
Although Ekman, Izard, Levinson, and Panksepp proposed different theories of basic 
emotions, Ekman’s model remains the most comprehensive in its stipulations and 
predictions. 
7 There is considerable hand-waving among BET theorists, and emotion researchers 
generally, about the multifactorial nature of emotion, along with the discounting 
provision that qualia are only one component. Because qualia are unverifiable, no 
measurable proxies have been substantiated, and alterations in the other averred 
components (overt movements, autonomic adjustments, neutrally localized activities) 
are only weakly intercorrelated and do not appear to conform to standard emotion 
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typologies (e.g., Duran, Reisenzein, & Fernández-Dols, 2017). We find no fault with a 
“multifactorial” definition of anything, of course, providing that the definition sets out 
what factors are expected and when. No such specification has been forthcoming, 
lending weight to the interpretation that the “multifactorial” definition merely postpones 
definition. 
8 The mechanism governing display rules mutated over the years. Originally, there were 
universals in the antecedent events that could trigger activation of the Facial Affect 
Program (Ekman, 1984; Ekman & Cordaro, 2011), and the Program’s outputs were 
intercepted and aligned with display rules before they could erupt on the face. The 
interception points were never spelled out, but the pre-post interception expressions 
may “differ in the involvement of the pyramidal and nonpyramidal pathways” (Ekman, 
Hager, & Friesen, 1981, p. 102). Objections by appraisal theorists (Scherer & Wallbott, 
1994) were accommodated by allowing that cultural differences in displays might hold 
sway on the stimulus end, such that complex appraisals could differentially determine 
what combination of basic emotions was activated. Thus, for appraisal theorists the 
action of “cultural display rules” changed from an output mechanism that altered the 
production of expressions, to an input mechanism that selected the emotions elicited. 
This particular redefinition of display rules appears to inject further doubt into how one 
interprets the three conditions of the Japanese-American experiment, which predicated 
its test of display rules on the prior assumption of equal emotions (Fridlund, 1994; Leys, 
2017). 
9 We confine our discussion here to BET’s categorical “facial expressions of emotion.” 
Ekman and Friesen (1969b) provided examples of other kinds of facial behavior such as 
symbolic faces (e.g., stylized tongue protrusions for “yucks!,” tongues in cheeks for 
skepticism), movements that highlighted language (e.g., brow flashes to show 
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momentary interest) or regulated conversation (e.g., frowns to indicate disapproval, 
brow flashes in turn-taking), and self-stimulatory behavior (e.g., lip-wiping). These 
protolinguistic and paralinguistic movements probably constitute the vast majority of 
everyday facial behavior. Chovil’s detailed observations of dyadic conversations 
suggested that fewer than 20% could be classified as one of BET’s categorical 
“expressions of emotion” (Chovil, 1989, 1991). Likewise, Fridlund (1994, p. 312) 
suggested that many occurrences of those iconic BET faces may simply be 
paralinguistic interjections. 
10 Apart from repeating Ekman’s incomplete account, Matsumoto and Hwang’s (2013) 
quote illustrates the common conflation of “emotions” and “expressions” within BET: 
What can be masked within BET is not the emotions but the expressions of those 
emotions. 
11 Western commentators on the Neurocultural Model and its origins in Tomkins’s and 
prior categorical views on emotion often do not indicate just how Western the models 
are, when they: (1) reductively neurologize emotion and make its “essence” a collection 
of neural circuits, (2) make emotion intracorporeal and thus subpersonal. Different ideas 
about “emotion” that are not reductive or subpersonal abound in other cultures and even 
in the history of Western conceptions of emotion, and non-reductive emotion accounts 
have emerged in contemporary psychology (e.g., Barrett, 2017; Russell, 2009). Given 
the ineffability and intractability of modern emotion concepts, one is hard-put to be 
presentist and claim progress. Lang (2018), Matt (2011), Reddy (2009), Rosenwein 
(2014) and especially Plamper (2015) have reviewed “turns” in scholarly treatments of 
emotion and how it has been: (a) experienced (originally in largely moral and/or 
theological terms), (b) expressed (as a function of race, religion, social class, gender 
roles, family structure and child-rearing practices, and a host of other factors), (c) 
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localized (in neurology, as adduced from ritual actions or other culturally situated action 
trajectories, or as an emergent process interstitial among cultural members), and (d) 
judged (dangerous, unruly, or advantageous). As Stearns and Stearns (1985) stated in 
their classic paper on “emotionology,” “No longer can we assume without proof … that 
people in the past shared our emotional experience, that we can use contemporary 
psychology to elucidate past behavior, or that we can use past data, without careful 
analysis, to bolster contemporary psychological theory” (p. 820). 
12 Al-Shawaf et al. (2015) do not account for how “emotions” could be products of 
natural selection unless they were causal entities that produced behavior benefitting 
reproductive fitness, directly or indirectly. Natural selection works on proximal effects 
and not interior causes, and so the evolution of specific “emotions” would imply 
selection of behaviors specifically attributable to those emotions. BET (pre-1990) was 
not adaptationist given that it embraced Darwin’s reflexive, vestigial view. The ev-
psych framework (post-1990), however, emphasized adaptive, strategic movements, but 
not necessarily automatic “expressions of emotions.” Indeed, much of evolutionary 
game theory had already suggested the tactical benefits of non-expression (e.g., Krebs 
& Dawkins, 1984). 
13 Previous treatments of BECV presented facial displays from the emitter’s standpoint, 
as “declarations of intent,” or indications of “social motives” (e.g., Fridlund, 1994, 
2017a). Here (Table 1) we present common usages of those facial displays. We made 
this shift because, despite our repeated statement that “intentions” and “motives” in 
BECV were external and to be adduced from the emitter’s line of action, many readers 
insisted on treating them as subpersonal, psychological states that were interchangeable 
with, or part of, emotion. The alternative presentations are equivalent because the 
likeliest scenario for the evolution of signals like facial displays is that they arose 
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biologically via the ritualization, or culturally via the conventionalization, of Heinroth’s 
and Huxley’s “intention movements.” These movements were incipient versions of 
social actions (Fridlund, 1994; Smith, 1977). 
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Figure 1. Number of Articles Published with the Keywords “Facial 
Expression” or “Facial Expression and Emotion,” by Journal and Year of 
Publication.  As these data show, the number of review articles published by both 
Psychological Bulletin and Psychological Review rose dramatically beginning in the 
1980’s, due in part to BET’s role in vitalizing studies of emotion and of facial 
expressions. The overall concordance between publications that used “facial 
expressions” alone (.52, 95% CI [.48, .56]), vs. with “emotions” (.48, 95% CI [.48, .56]) 
was near-total, χ2 (1, N = 600) = 1.47, p = .225, 95% CI [–.02, .09]. This finding 
illustrates the Western “received wisdom” that the two are related inexorably, despite 
ample empirical evidence to the contrary.  
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Figure 2. The Neurocultural Partition. Ekman’s “Neurocultural theory” 
partitioned facial expressions into two kinds (Ekman, 1972; Ekman & Friesen, 1969). 
On the left were the categorical “facial expressions of emotion,” which were hardwired 
(hence, “neuro”), spontaneous, “biological,” and cross-culturally, they were uniformly 
produced and universally “recognized.” These iconic expressions occurred mainly in 
private, but were approximated in art and by photographed poses. On the right were 
public facial expressions, those that resulted from supervention by learned “display 
rules” which suppressed or modified those native expressions and were required 
because of the demands of civility (hence, they were “cultural”). Such “social” 
expressions varied across cultures, and because they no longer freely expressed their 
originating emotions and could even simulate them, they were judged unspontaneous 
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Table 1. Two Approaches to Facial Displays: Expressions vs. Functional Social Tools 
Sample facial behavior State expressed (BET) Social use (BECV) 
Smiling Happiness Influence interactant to play or affiliate 
Pouting Sadness Recruit interactant’s succor or protection 
Scowling Anger Influence interactant to submit 
Gasping Fear Deflect interactant’s attack via one’s own submission or incipient retreat 




(Poker face) or no emotion 
 
Lead the interactant nowhere in interaction trajectory 
 
“Micromonentary,” blended or 
“compound” expressions 
“Leaked” or “blended” 
emotion Conflict between displayer’s interactional tactics 
Note. The table includes common usages of facial behaviors as social tools, as reflected by their behavioral consequences; the exact 
usages of facial displays in BECV depend on the interactants and their specific interaction context. 
BET = Basic Emotions Theory. BECV = Behavioral Ecology View of facial displays. 
 
